ABSTRACT This article examines the Race Equality Directive (RED) and its transposition in the context of a new European Union (EU) member state, Baltic Lithuania. Taking this post-communist society as a case study, it is suggested that while formal legislative compliance with the RED has been broadly attained, transposed anti-discrimination legislation and national policy implementation initiatives may not adequately take into account societal attitudes and norms. The historical legacy of Soviet times, the contemporary post-communist experience, and the current economic crisis have resulted in a fragile national identity and a propensity towards populist and even xenophobic responses to uncertainty. These factors are explored in terms of their potential for undermining the objectives of EU-derived legislation designed to promote racial and ethnic tolerance. The article concludes that while a 'differentiated' Europeanisation has not occurred in formal terms, the possibility exists of 'differential' Europeanisation emerging in post-communist new EU member states such as Lithuania.
INTRODUCTION
The 'Europeanisation' of Eastern Europe has generally been described as a process in which the political project of European Union (EU) integration is realised through the transfer of certain legal and institutional practices and the dissemination of sets of values embodying liberal democratic norms to the domestic contexts of candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Graziano and Vink 2006) . Within the burgeoning literature on this topic, there has been recent debate as to whether as new member states of the EU, former applicant countries now freed of the asymmetrical pressure of political 'conditionality' from Brussels, might reassert different sets of policy priorities, especially with respect to 'sensitive' areas of social policy (de la Porte 2002; Lendvai 2008; Sedelmeier 2008; Thomson 2009 ). Some have even argued that as 'incentive structures' change with full membership, 'different worlds of compliance' may emerge in the new EU member states, and that previous externally induced reform momentum may slow (Falkner and Treib 2008; Leiber 2007) . Beyond the matter of formal compliance with the requirements of the European acquis communautaire, the body of European law which candidate countries are obliged to transpose into domestic law as a condition of future acceptance, there is a more challenging question. Has Europeanisation occurred, such that it has succeeded in bringing about sustainable changes at a deeper level, in terms of value structures, social attitudes and behaviours? It is now over a decade since the 'alignment' process accompanying EU accession negotiations began, and more than five years since the first Eastern European states finally 'joined Europe'. It therefore, 
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In the realm of EU social policy, the key EU Directive intended to combat racial and ethnic discrimination, the Race Equality Directive (RED) provides something of an acid test (Council of the European Communities 2000). Mark Bell (2008) has questioned whether the 'transposition of the Race Equality Directive has resulted in the genuine "Europeanisation" of anti-discrimination law and policy and whether this implies convergence in the direction of a common model ' (2008: 36) . A sociological understanding of this question requires that new EU member states of Eastern Europe be viewed, not simply as passive receptacles for policy mandates from Brussels, but within the trajectory of their previous Soviet era history, in term of their contemporary sociological character as post-communist societies, and now as neo-liberal economies which may have entered a period of protracted economic decline, bringing in its wake new social turbulence and uncertainties.
The eastwards enlargement of the European Union, incorporating ten countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea, was intended to consolidate political and economic transition in post-communist Eastern Europe from centrally planned to market economies and a 'return' to a European sphere of pluralistic democracy. As a political project, enlargement was accompanied by an expansion of formal European citizenship rights, including the proscription of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity in the field of employment and other key areas of social life (Hansen 2000; Bell 2002: 388) . Taking the new member state of Lithuania as a case study, the success of this project is critically examined in this sensitive policy area of racial and ethnic discrimination. Recent studies of implementation of EU policy based on individual country studies have mainly focussed on the institutional and political actor levels, rather than their sociological and historical dynamics (Hartlapp 2009; Pridham 5 2009). The current article suggests that in order to understand the role of Europeantransposed policy measures in promoting tolerance of 'others' in the new EU member states, it is necessary to interrogate deeper sometimes hidden-from-view social attitudes. While the empirical evidence reviewed here is not conclusive, nevertheless quantitative and qualitative data are sufficiently ambiguous to be concerning.
First, an overview of the economic and social context of Lithuania is presented.
Second, seemingly contradictory empirical survey evidence is examined suggesting significantly lower perceptions of discrimination with respect to ethnic and racial minorities in comparison to averages for the European Union, and at the same time, high levels of expressed hostility towards a variety of minority groups. Third, the main elements of the legislative and policy implementation framework of the transposed Directive are described, along with the measures adopted by the Lithuanian government to promote racial and ethnic understanding. The article concludes by suggesting that the transposition of the RED may have been largely successful in respect of adopted formal governmental policies, but that Europeanisation while not 'differentiated' may already be 'differential' implying divergence from a common model of European norms of racial and ethnic inclusion (Andersen and Sitter 2006; Bauer et al. 2007 ). Lithuania's uncertain future trajectory in this respect, may exemplify a wider lack of resonance for race equality legislation in the post-communist new EU member states.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
With a current population of 3,366,000, Lithuania is the largest of the three small Other indicators suggest the costs of transition for the population have been considerable, in terms of social inequality (also among the highest levels in the EU), low and declining adult life expectancy, negative population growth, as well as extraordinarily high suicide rates. Taken together with poor public health indicators, an absence of employment rights in the workplace, the highest proportional outmigration of its population of any new EU member state, and the current picture of life-quality and well-being is altogether rather grim (Woolfson and Calite 2008) .
Comprehensive radical reforms inspired by pro-market neo-liberal policies during the transition period have had specific economic and social outcomes in terms of spiralling inequities, impaired social cohesion and a debilitated civil society.
Nevertheless, on paper at least, the new democratic Constitution of Lithuania embodies certain fundamental rights for its citizens such as the equality of all persons, the right of every ethnic or national group to foster their culture, and imposes 7 limitations on freedom of speech on the grounds of incitement on racial or religious grounds. Article 29 of the Constitution lays down that the rights of a human being may not be restricted, nor may be granted any privileges on the ground of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views (Žiobienė 2008: 2-3) . The general provisions of the Constitution are complemented by the Law on National Minorities that recognizes notably that 'the cultural heritage connected with a national ethnic minority is an integral part of the cultural heritage of the Republic of Lithuania'. This law establishes a general prohibition on discrimination based on national or ethnic origin while defining positive actions to advance minority cultures. In particular, the legislation (art. 3.2) confirms the State's obligation to promote the national consciousness and self-expression of minorities in order 'to foster and develop the culture, language, customs and traditions of their nation or ethnic group and to preserve their national/ethnic identity' (United Nations 2008: 10). Thus far, the outlook for racial and ethnic tolerance might be viewed as promising. The reality is rather different.
DISCRIMINATION IN LITHUANIA
The historical incorporation Eastern European states into the Soviet sphere, has produced a continuing sensitivity to questions of national identity during the postindependence period (Brubaker 1996) . Thus, in Lithuania a popular and resurgent nationalism exists based on the imagined and real historical particularities of a unique language and national culture. Yet, on the surface at least, independent Lithuania has enjoyed significant advantages over many parts of the former Soviet Union. During fifty years of Soviet rule, the level of inward migration from other parts of the Soviet Union was on a considerably lower scale than, for example, in neighbouring (Eurobarometer 2008a: 17) . Lithuania scored the lowest percentage of the population who actually perceived multiple discrimination existing in society, at a mere 2% (Eurobarometer 2008a: 17) .
Compared to the EU average of 19% of respondents who claimed to have experienced discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds, the figure for Lithuania was only 7%, just above that of Malta which at 5% was the lowest in the EU (Eurobarometer 2008a: 52) . In detailed country data 'substantial disparities' between Lithuanian and EU average figures were noted. Thus, 'belonging to a different ethnic group' was seen as a 'disadvantage' by 27% of Lithuanian respondents, compared to 62% of respondents for the EU as a whole. 'Belonging to a different religion' was seen as a 'disadvantage' by 21% of Lithuania respondents, compared to 39% for the EU (Eurobarometer 2008b: 1) . Thus, somewhat surprisingly, 'widespread' discrimination based on ethnic and racial origin or religious beliefs was 'perceived to be much less prevalent in Lithuania' than in the European Union as a whole (Eurobarometer 2008b: 2) .
In fact, the proportion of those who perceived 'widespread' ethnic and racial discrimination was less than half the EU average (23% compared to 64%), as were perceptions of 'widespread' religious discrimination (15% compared to 44%).
Moreover, only small percentages of Lithuanian respondents believed that discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin was 'more widespread than it was five years ago' (23% compared to 49% for the EU), and similarly, for discrimination based on religious beliefs, (16% compared to 42% for the EU) (Eurobarometer 2008b: 2). Again, a significantly lower percentage of Lithuanian respondents (just over half EU averages) considered that 'more MPs' were needed of a 'different ethnic origin' (24% compared to 44%) (Eurobarometer 2008b: 4) .
These data would appear to indicate that discrimination along a number of dimensions, is not regarded as a salient issue by Lithuanian respondents. By contrast, figures regarding perceived discrimination arising from disability and gender factors, were much in line with averages for the EU25. On 'knowledge of rights' in the event of discrimination or harassment, Lithuanian responses were also virtually identical to the EU average results. A majority of Lithuanians (58%) did not know their rights, with only just under a third (31%) claiming otherwise. The comparable figures for the EU as a whole were a near perfect match at 56% and 32% respectively (Eurobarometer 2008b: 3) . Discrimination on the grounds of sex or disability (both prominent in EU 'mainstreaming' activities) again accords with the EU averages, leaving the anomaly that perceived discrimination on race, ethnicity and religion appears to be significantly less than EU averages. Thus, while discrimination is acknowledged as a factor in particular areas of social life, and with respect to specific groups, it appears to be only reluctantly recognised with regard to race and ethnicity, producing the paradox of a seemingly diminished perception of discrimination.
However, EU-level comparative survey results may mask a more ambiguous reality.
A recent national survey provides contrasting findings (Socialinių tyrimų instituto, etninių tyrimų centras 2008). Results suggest more deeply embedded discriminatory attitudes if measured in terms of 'social distance' towards 'others'.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE (maximum half page)
Respondents were asked to indicate those ethnic, racial or other minorities that they would not wish to have as neighbours. Over two-thirds of those sampled expressed the view that they would not like to have Roma (Čigonais/Romais) (69.2%) as neighbours, followed by more than half for homosexuals (59.3%) and Chechens (Čečenais) (55.7%), more than a third for Muslims (Musulmonais) and refugees (Pabėgėliais) (44.5% and 42.7% respectively), and nearly one third for black persons (Juodaodžiais) (31.3%) and Jews (Žydais) (30.6%). The percentage of those expressing negative views towards Jewish people had nearly doubled, from 18.3% in the preceding year. The survey also noted that four out of five Lithuanians (80%) were reluctant to work with or communicate with anyone who is 'different' (on the basis of race, sexual preference, language, or religion). Attitudes towards 'traditional' ethnic groups (Russians, Poles, Jews) have also become more negative and a 'growing lack of tolerance, identified among youth' suggesting that a 'natural transformation to tolerant and open civic society is not taking place' (Andriukaitis, 2008: 3) . Today, in an official narrative of 'moral equivalence', the Nazi and Soviet periods are equally regarded as marking the totalitarian oppression of the Lithuanian nation.
Public displays of emblems of either era are legally proscribed. However, Lithuania's record in prosecuting Nazi-era war criminals from among its population has been far from vigorous, in contrast to efforts to bring Soviet collaborators to justice (Lawson 2008 ). The historical annihilation of the most numerous visible group of 'outsiders' in Lithuanian society is a matter of record. Hostility towards another traditional group, the Roma, currently numbering some 3,000 persons is intense and openly displayed in clearly remains the most vulnerable group with regard to multiple discrimination in the fields of employment, education, housing, policing, etc.
Extreme poverty, low educational levels, involvement in illegal activities and negative attitudes of the majority keep this group locked in social exclusion.
The most common Roma stereotype is that they are inclined to commit offences, dirty, ailing and in general untrustworthy (ENAR 2008: 9) .
While rejecting what it calls 'the myth of self-imposed isolation', ENAR estimates that close to 40% of Roma do not know the state language (although a majority of them do speak Russian). Thus, the question of their education and of later employment is 'very complicated' (ENAR 2008: 9) . Roma unemployment rates are significantly higher than in the general population. However, although official data do not record ethnicity with regard to employment, it would appear that active discrimination against Roma in employment and other spheres is prevalent.
In this regard, a landmark discrimination case is reported involving a Roma woman who applied for a job in a café as a cleaner and dishwasher.
When the administrator of the café saw her, she immediately asked whether S.
M. was living in Kirtimai -a notorious Vilnius district where the Roma community live under severe conditions. When S.M. answered positively, the administrator of the café openly expressed her indignation saying loudly to her colleague, that 'now they even teach those Roma to speak Lithuanian!' She immediately said that the dishwasher position was taken and that they did not need one anymore (ENAR 2008: 12-13 ).
The non-governmental Human Rights Monitoring Institute dispatched a Lithuanian woman to apply for the advertised job the same day, in a strategy of 'situation testing'. The new applicant was accepted at once and was informed in a derisive manner about the previous visit of the Roma applicant. This was the first discrimination case on the ground of ethnicity in Lithuanian jurisprudence, albeit pursued under the Labour Code rather than provisions of racial equality law. The complaint of discrimination was upheld both in the lower and higher courts, resulting in the award of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages of around 800 Euros.
Individual incidents of discrimination however, remain mostly unreported and 
TRANSPOSITION OF THE DIRECTIVE AND THE POLICY RESPONSE
How representative such incidents are may be open to question. In line with the objectives of racial and ethnic tolerance promoted by the European Commission, the Lithuanian authorities have attempted to pursue a path of measured policy responses, and in the face of particular high profile incidents which have attracted international concern, somewhat more vigorous, albeit at times, hesitant actions.
It is important to note that most of these events and many others not documented here, However, 'mainstreaming' (in the parlance of the European Union) the objectives of the promotion of racial and ethnic tolerance, presupposes an active civil society which has proved an elusive ingredient in post-communist societies (Howard 2003) . In the socially fragmented neo-liberal Baltic States, civil society remains perilously weak.
With key 'social partners' of trade unions representing little more than one in ten of the workforce (the second lowest level of trade union density in the European Union), and with employers' organizations similarly lacking representativeness in the business community, their role in promoting the objectives of anti-discrimination legislation is marginal. Indeed, the trade unions have argued for the maintenance of labour market restrictions on incoming migrant labour in favour of the employment of the domestic workforce, a logical if narrowly defensive short-term position. NGOs that have specifically championed human rights appear to have had some, if rather limited success in promoting greater social tolerance. However, all of these bodies operate within a wider social and political environment that is largely unreceptive, and in the current crisis, openly hostile to any measures that might encourage new 'outsiders' to venture to Lithuania, in addition to the imagined threats from 'outsiders' already in their midst.
As Mark Bell has pointed out, the extent to which anti-discrimination directives 'resonate with the national social and political environment seems a key factor in determining the extent to which they are embraced…(thus) the true extent of the Europeanisation of anti-discrimination law will only become clearer in the future when it can be seen whether these new laws genuinely effected wider changes in the domestic socio-political context ' (2008: 43) . In Lithuania today, five years after transposition, this socio-political context is problematic. The Soviet era experience, emigration and now economic recession, has created a particular legacy in terms of a fragile national identity and damaged social cohesion. Today, frustration, disappointment and, at times, open social unrest have emerged in what is now a 'failed' Baltic tiger economy (Woolfson 2010) . As the crisis has deepened, support for the European project as a whole as has diminished, along with the expectations of the benefits that would accompany EU membership. This conjuncture, together with the absence of trusted civil society organisations and of legitimised political institutions, offers fertile ground for a substratum of latent racist, homophobic and xenophobic ideologies. While, as yet, unlike some other new member states such as Hungary, no political party openly espouses racist policies, this should not offer grounds for complacency. Authoritarian populism and xenophobia, while also ubiquitous features of the broader European political landscape, remain engrained in Lithuanian political life and carry the potential to metamorphose into an illiberal politics of exclusion (Berezin 2009 ).
Nor are future prospects for the beneficial impacts of the RED particularly encouraging. In the current post-accession period, entrenched domestic resistances may re-assert themselves and ground-level challenges to implementation of 'contested' or 'Brussels-imposed' social objectives can be more easily mounted. As the temporal distance from accession grows, further measures, particularly at the level of civil society, may be required in order to assist new EU member states in combating discrimination in ways not foreseen by those who drafted the original provisions of the RED. Substantial divergence from the requirements of formal legislative alignment with European law may be difficult to sustain. In this sense, Europeanisation, at least in terms of legal architecture if not practice, cannot remain 'differentiated' in the longer run. Less tractable, however, are attitudinal divergences underpinning a different, and more uncertain trajectory of 'differential' Europeanisation that rejects many of the guiding assumptions underlying European initiatives designed to foster non-discrimination. The ultimate effectiveness of the EU's legislation on racial and ethnic tolerance therefore remains to be determined in the new member states. What is becoming increasingly clear is that doubts concerning convergence towards a common model may be well-founded.
